Screen a name
curl --request GET \
--url https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name \
--header 'Authorization: Bearer <token>'import requests
url = "https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name"
headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer <token>"}
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers)
print(response.text)const options = {method: 'GET', headers: {Authorization: 'Bearer <token>'}};
fetch('https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name', options)
.then(res => res.json())
.then(res => console.log(res))
.catch(err => console.error(err));<?php
$curl = curl_init();
curl_setopt_array($curl, [
CURLOPT_URL => "https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name",
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_ENCODING => "",
CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS => 10,
CURLOPT_TIMEOUT => 30,
CURLOPT_HTTP_VERSION => CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1,
CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST => "GET",
CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER => [
"Authorization: Bearer <token>"
],
]);
$response = curl_exec($curl);
$err = curl_error($curl);
curl_close($curl);
if ($err) {
echo "cURL Error #:" . $err;
} else {
echo $response;
}package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"io"
)
func main() {
url := "https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name"
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer <token>")
res, _ := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
defer res.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
fmt.Println(string(body))
}HttpResponse<String> response = Unirest.get("https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer <token>")
.asString();require 'uri'
require 'net/http'
url = URI("https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name")
http = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port)
http.use_ssl = true
request = Net::HTTP::Get.new(url)
request["Authorization"] = 'Bearer <token>'
response = http.request(request)
puts response.read_bodyScreening
Screen a name
Fuzzy-screen a person, company, vessel or aircraft name against sanctions-list names and aliases
GET
/
screen
/
name
Screen a name
curl --request GET \
--url https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name \
--header 'Authorization: Bearer <token>'import requests
url = "https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name"
headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer <token>"}
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers)
print(response.text)const options = {method: 'GET', headers: {Authorization: 'Bearer <token>'}};
fetch('https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name', options)
.then(res => res.json())
.then(res => console.log(res))
.catch(err => console.error(err));<?php
$curl = curl_init();
curl_setopt_array($curl, [
CURLOPT_URL => "https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name",
CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER => true,
CURLOPT_ENCODING => "",
CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS => 10,
CURLOPT_TIMEOUT => 30,
CURLOPT_HTTP_VERSION => CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1,
CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST => "GET",
CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER => [
"Authorization: Bearer <token>"
],
]);
$response = curl_exec($curl);
$err = curl_error($curl);
curl_close($curl);
if ($err) {
echo "cURL Error #:" . $err;
} else {
echo $response;
}package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"io"
)
func main() {
url := "https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name"
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil)
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer <token>")
res, _ := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
defer res.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
fmt.Println(string(body))
}HttpResponse<String> response = Unirest.get("https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer <token>")
.asString();require 'uri'
require 'net/http'
url = URI("https://api.compliapi.com/api/v1/screen/name")
http = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port)
http.use_ssl = true
request = Net::HTTP::Get.new(url)
request["Authorization"] = 'Bearer <token>'
response = http.request(request)
puts response.read_bodyScreens a name against the primary names and aliases of every party on the sanctions lists with name coverage — the US OFAC SDN and OFAC Consolidated (non-SDN) lists, the EU consolidated financial sanctions list, the UK Sanctions List, the Swiss SECO list, the UN Security Council Consolidated List, Canada’s Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List, Australia’s DFAT Consolidated List, New Zealand’s Russia Sanctions Register, the French Trésor register and the Japan MOF list — covering individuals, entities, vessels and aircraft. It also checks the US export-control and debarment lists (
A name match is a lead for review, not a determination: common names produce partial matches with unrelated parties. Pass
Three things differ from the sanctions lists:
What to know before relying on a match:
us_csl), described below, and FinCEN’s special measures (us_fincen_special_measures), described further down. The same person listed by several authorities appears once per list, so a hit on six lists returns six matches. Use it when onboarding a customer or vendor, before paying a counterparty, or anywhere you hold a name rather than an identifier.
Matching is fuzzy and explainable:
- Order-, case-, accent- and punctuation-insensitive —
Putin Vladimir,PUTIN, Vladimirandvladimir putinare the same name. - Typo-tolerant per word —
Vladimr Putinstill scores 96 againstVladimir PUTIN. Words of three letters or fewer (al,bin,kim) must match exactly. - Partial names — a query whose words all appear in a longer listed name (or the reverse) matches at a capped score of at most 90, decaying as the longer name grows. A single short word on its own never matches.
- Aliases and other scripts — every alias (a.k.a., f.k.a., n.k.a.) is screened, including the Cyrillic, Arabic and Japanese spellings and transliteration variants the lists publish. Aliases a list itself flags as weak or low quality (OFAC’s and DFAT’s weak aliases, the UN’s and the UK’s “low quality”, SECO’s
low, Trésor’s alias faible, Japan’s 確定に十分でない別名) are not matched, but are returned inmetadata.weak_aliases. - No transliteration — a Latin-script query does not match a name the list publishes only in Cyrillic or Japanese; most lists publish Latin spellings too.
YYYY, YYYY-MM or YYYY-MM-DD. Listed parties whose published birth dates all disagree are excluded and counted in excluded; parties with no published birth date are kept. Listings with several alternative birth dates match if any one agrees, and circa dates allow two years either side.ISO 3166 code or English country name. Compared against the party’s listed nationalities, citizenships, address countries and vessel flag (in English, French or Japanese, as each list publishes them). It ranks matches and explains them in
reasons, but never excludes a match — listed countries are too incomplete to rule a party out.A passport, national ID or registration number you hold for the subject. It is compared, ignoring formatting, with the identity documents each candidate party lists: a party that lists the number ranks first, ahead of higher name scores, with the reason in
reasons. A different number is noted but never excludes a match — people hold several documents and renew passports. Many listings carry no document at all (“No listed document to compare”).Your own reference for the subject — a customer, invoice or wallet id, up to 200 characters. Echoed as
ref in the response and recorded on the call’s audit trail.Comma-separated list slugs to screen against. Defaults to every enabled list with name coverage.
lists_checked names only the lists that actually hold names at the time of the call; lists without name coverage (the crime and risk lists, FBI Lazarus, Israel NBCTF) are dropped, and a filter naming only such lists is a 400.Response
Same verdicts as the screening envelope —sanctioned is true only for a sanctions-list match, flagged for any match — plus threshold, excluded, and scored matches:
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
value | The listed name that matched — the primary name or an alias |
score | Name similarity, 0–100. match is exact at 100, otherwise partial |
name | The party’s primary name |
name_type | Which name matched: primary, aka, fka or nka |
party_type | individual, entity, vessel or aircraft |
reasons | Plain-language explanation of the score and of any birth_date/country comparison |
list_versions (top level) | The version of each list checked — see list versions |
metadata | Published facts, as each list publishes them: dates_of_birth (ISO dates, circa YYYY or YYYY to YYYY; OFAC’s own 19 Apr 1947 form), nationalities, citizenships, countries (country names in the list’s language — the French register writes RUSSIE), places_of_birth, vessel, weak_aliases, programmes, … |
Example response
{
"value": "Bank Melli",
"flagged": true,
"sanctioned": true,
"lists_checked": ["ofac", "ofac_consolidated", "fr_tresor", "jp_mof_sanctions", "eu_fsf", "uk_fcdo_sanctions", "ch_seco", "un_sc", "ca_sanctions", "au_dfat"],
"threshold": 85,
"excluded": 0,
"matches": [
{
"list": "ofac",
"list_name": "US OFAC SDN",
"list_type": "sanctions",
"match": "partial",
"value": "BANK MELLI IRAN",
"score": 90.0,
"name": "BANK MELLI IRAN",
"name_type": "primary",
"party_type": "entity",
"reasons": ["Name is similar to the listed primary name (score 90)"],
"source_url": "https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=25578",
"metadata": {
"sdn_name": "BANK MELLI IRAN",
"programs": "IFSR, IRAN, SDGT",
"party_type": "entity",
"countries": ["Iran", "France", "United Arab Emirates"],
"weak_aliases": ["BMI"]
}
}
]
}
birth_date and country to separate namesakes, and treat the final decision as part of your compliance process. Each call is one request against your quota and is written to your organization’s audit trail.
US export-control and debarment lists
Theus_csl list holds the Commerce and State Department lists from the US government’s Consolidated Screening List: the BIS Entity List, Denied Persons List, Unverified List and Military End User List, the State Department’s ITAR Debarred list and its Nonproliferation Sanctions. (The Treasury lists in that file are OFAC’s, which CompliAPI ingests from OFAC directly as ofac and ofac_consolidated.)
These are export controls and debarments, not asset freezes, so a us_csl match sets flagged and never sanctioned. Each match names the specific list and agency in metadata.list and metadata.agency, with the license_requirement, license_policy, federal_register_notice and listing date where the list publishes them:
{
"list": "us_csl",
"list_name": "US export-control and debarment lists (CSL)",
"list_type": "risk",
"match": "exact",
"score": 100,
"name": "Harbin General Aircraft Industry Co., Ltd.",
"party_type": null,
"metadata": {
"list": "Military End User List",
"list_code": "MEU",
"agency": "Bureau of Industry and Security",
"countries": ["CN"],
"listed_on": "2020-12-23",
"federal_register_notice": "85 FR 83799"
}
}
- No party type. The file does not say whether a party is a person or a company, so these matches have no
party_typeand atypefilter leaves them out. - No birth dates.
birth_datecannot exclude a namesake on these lists. - Expired denial orders are dropped. The Denied Persons List keeps orders after they end; only orders still in force are screened.
lists without us_csl.
FinCEN special measures
Theus_fincen_special_measures list holds the foreign financial institutions that FinCEN, the US Treasury’s financial-intelligence bureau, has found to be “of primary money laundering concern” and made subject to a special measure under one of three statutes: Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Section 9714 of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, or the FEND Off Fentanyl Act. Examples are Huione Group, Bitzlato, PM2BTC and Bank of Dandong.
A special measure restricts what US financial institutions may do with the named institution, typically correspondent accounts or transmittals of funds. It freezes no assets, so a match sets flagged and never sanctioned:
{
"list": "us_fincen_special_measures",
"list_name": "FinCEN special measures (Section 311)",
"list_type": "risk",
"match": "exact",
"score": 100,
"name": "Huione Group",
"party_type": "entity",
"metadata": {
"authority": "Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (31 U.S.C. 5318A)",
"status": "final",
"listed_on": "2025-10-15",
"countries": ["Cambodia"]
}
}
statusisfinalorproposed.finalmeans FinCEN issued a final rule or an order.proposedmeans FinCEN published its finding with a proposed rule that it has neither finalized nor withdrawn; no prohibition is in force yet.- Named institutions only. Rescinded and withdrawn measures are left out. So are measures against whole jurisdictions (Burma, Iran, North Korea) and against classes of transactions, such as virtual-currency mixing.
- Names, not wallets. FinCEN’s rules name institutions and the affiliates they define; they publish no crypto addresses or domains, so this list is checked by
/screen/nameonly. - Maintained by hand. FinCEN publishes a web table, not a data file. CompliAPI reviews the table and updates the list by hand, so a new measure can appear here some days after FinCEN announces it.
metadata.notecarries a caveat where one applies, and each match’ssource_urllinks the notice it comes from.
lists without us_csl and us_fincen_special_measures.